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Abstract This paper presents an overview of legal and eco-
nomic theories used to assess liability and damages for loss of
nonmarket goods arising from an accidental oil spill. Several dif-
ferent economic methods used for quantifying values are dis-
cussed and critiqued. Also reviewed are the fundamental legal
doctrines that permit individuals and public agencies to seek
compensation for these damages. To illustrate the applicability
of these economic and legal theories, two case studies arc pre-
sented and evaluated in terms of the principles presented earlier.
Introduction
Accidental oil spills usually receive considerable public attention
and concern because of the datnages to biota and natural resources
and the losses suffered by individuals and by business owners and
employees. The proper measurement of economic damages from oil
spills requires that economically defensible and empirically feasible
estimates of losses be developed. However, the actual resolution of
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damage claims, via compensation of victims, requires the existence
of a legal-institutional structure within which damage claims can be
adjudicated. Despite the critical interplay of economic principles
on the otie hand and legal principles on the other, there have been
relatively few attempts to relate economic and legal issues arising
in the context of accidental oil spills (see, e.g.. Brown, 1982; Jimenez,
1982; Halter and Thomas, 1982; and Sorensen, 1976a,b).
This paper is an attempt to integrate the economic and legal
analysis of the nonmarket-valued losses suffered as a consequence
of accidental oil spills. We first present a brief outline of the eco-
nomic methods used for estimating nonmarket-valued losses. We
then outline the legal principles used to determine the compensa-
tion due to those who have suffered from oil spills. Next we ana-
lyze the legal and economic applications of the Santa Barbara
Channel spill and the grounding of the SS Zoe Colocotroni, based
on the principles developed earlier. The last section consists ofan
overview and summary.
Economic Methods for Estimating
Nonmarket-Valued Losses
The market costs of accidental oil spills are generally estimable,
since the market value of the materials and labor used in cleanup
are fairly easy to establish.' The estimation of nonmarket values,
however, poses several problems, especially in connection with
damage to public recreational sites and to noncommercial biota.
When recreational facilities are provided by the private market,
the losses to users and owners of the facilities or resources are esti-
mated on the basis of market prices. It is much more difficult to
estimate the value of losses when an accidental oil spill causes dam-
age to publicly owned facilities, wildlife, and recreational fisheries,
precisely because these "goods" are not traded in private markets.
Yet these losses must be estimated. Otherwise, we arc implicitly as-
suming these nonmarket goods have zero value, an unjustifiable
assumption.
Several methods have been developed for use in quantifying non-
market values (and hence, damage costs). These include (1) gross
expenditure approach, (2) market value of catch method, (3) cost
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(6) willingness-to-pay method, and (7) the hedonic pricing method.
The first three methods are without economic merit, and for this
reason will be discussed only briefly. The willingness-to-pay method
will be discussed in more detail because it is fundamentally sound
(though in practice it may produce unreliable results)^ and because
it has been widely used in many situations involving nonmarket
public goods. The hedonic pricing method represents a relatively
recent development in economic theory, but the data requirements
of this method severely limit its practical applicability.-'
The Gross Expenditure Method
This method views the total expenditures incurred by individuals
in the process of visiting a recreational area as a good measure of
the value of benefits received from the area's recreational facilities.
The basis for this method is the principle that the benefits must be
approximately equal to the gross expenditures, or the consumer
would not have "purchased" this good. Clearly, this method cannot
be justified on the basis of economic theory. While gross expendi-
tures may provide an estimate of the minimum level of benefits,
the actual level could be much higher than the gross expenditure.
As illustrated in Figure 1, for the demand curve Dy{WQi), there is
a consumer surplus equal to the area P^AB which is not measured
by using the gross expenditure method. Moreover, this approach
cannot account for the marginal value of the recreational site (nor
the marginal loss from damage to it).
The Market Value of Catch Method
This method estimates the value of recreational harvests by using
the market value of the catch. Once again, this method may provide
an estimate of the minimum level of benefits, but it obviously ig-
nores the benefits individuals get from the hobby itself. This ap-
proximation is likely to provide unreliable estimates.
The Cost Method
The cost method assumes that the value of the recreation site is
equal to the cost of operating it. The basic flaw in this method is
that it does not focus on consumer behavior and, consequently.214 G. B. Assaf, B. G. Kroetch, and S. C. Mathur
Quantity
FIGURE 1. Simplified representation of a loss of benefits as a result of oil spill.
(Adapted from Smith et al., 1983.)
this method has no basis in economic theory. Further, in the context
of publicly provided goods, this would be an extremely dangerous
principle to accept since it provides justification for any and all
investments in the production of the public goods.
The Value of Services Method
The value of services method uses a schedule of charges for all the
services offered as an estimate of the value of these services. The
charges are based on the assumed market value of the services. If
the imputed values are based on previous, theoretically sound eco-
nomic studies, this approach does have some merit. Moreover, this
method focuses on the consumer's willingness to pay for the services,Nonmarket Valuations of Accidental Oil Spills 215
and on this basis it is superior to the three discussed earlier. The
practical problem it poses is to compute reasonable market prices
for services that are inherently noncommercial.
The Replacement Cost Method
The replacement cost method values losses by estimating the cost
of replacing damaged biota. One approach that has been used to
establish the cost of replacing noncommercial biomass has em-
ployed the price lists of firms supplying organisms for experiments
or animals for zoos. For example, according to Brown (1982), Cali-
fornia uses a replacement cost of $0.25 for sea urchins.
The major problem with the replacement cost method is that
the price of an organism sent to a lab. or of an animal sent to a zoo
includes the costs of collection and transportation as well as a nor-
mal level of profit. Since these costs are not present with naturally
occurring biota, the replacement cost method overestimates the
value of lost organisms in situ.
The Willingness-to-Pay Method
The willingness-to-pay (WTP) method focuses clearly on consumer
behavior, and attempts to estimate a demand curve for the product,
just as if consumers were purchasing recreation in the private
market. The method then estimates the value of benefits lost, by
applying to the "pseudodemand" curve the same measure that is
applied to actual demand curves for market-oriented commodities,
consumer surplus.
The objective of the WTP method is to place a dollar value of
this loss of surplus. For example, as shown in Figure 1, if water
quality deteriorates from WQ2 to WQi, the demand for the re-
source declines, resulting in a leftward shift in the demand curve. If
the imputed price is Pj, this means a loss of surplus, shown by the
area A'ABB'. This is the area WTP estimates.
Consumer surplus, of course, is an approximation of the more
fundamental measure, compensating variation in income. Strictly
speaking, for normal goods consumer surplus will always be greater
than the compensating variation measure, and so will be an over-
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sumption of the particular commodity. In practice, however, this
discrepancy is usually small relative to the other inaccuracies and
approximations normally present in any empirical analysis and
thus poses few problems."^
The practical problem in using consumer surplus for nonmarket
goods is that there are no historical prices and quantities from
which a demand curve can be established. Consequently, two types
of approaches have been used to estimate people's willingness to
pay for recreational facilities: (1) the direct survey approach, and
(2) the travel cost approach.
Under the direct survey approach, a random sample of people
affected by an accident is asked to indicate how much they are
willing to pay to attain some stated incremental increase in site
quality (or willing to accept as compensation for an incremental
decrease in quality). The major problem with ihe survey approach
is possible bias in the respondents' replies.^ For example, a respon-
dent who thinks his reply may affect his tax burden may understate
his willingness to pay; or if the respondent believes that his reply
will have no effect on his tax burden, he may overstate his willing-
ness to pay, thus leading to strategic bias. Direct surveys are thus
not entirely reliable.
The travel cost approach is an alternative way of estimating
willingness to pay. As in the direct survey approach, a random
group of visitors to a recreation site is selected and surveyed. From
each member of this group, detailed information about the visitor's
permanent residence, distance from residence to recreational site,
and expenses for the visit (including hotel, food, and travel) is col-
lected. Based on these parameters, site-specific values can be
derived.^
As with the direct survey approach, the results obtained from
the travel cost method are not entirely reliable. The implicit
assumption in this approach is that all expenses incurred on the
trip are for the purpose of visiting the site. However, the trip itself
may be considered as a source of satisfaction by the visitor, mean-
ing that part of the expenditures may be for "purchasing" the trip
instead of the benefits from recreation. If the trip involves other
stops, the expenditures may not have been made for the purpose
of any single site visit.Nonmarket Valuations of Accidental Oil Spills 217
The Hedonic Pricing Method
The hedonic pricing method is a generalization of the travel cost
approach to estimating the willingness to pay. However, the con-
cept of hedonic pricing is a fairly general one and has been applied
to a wide variety of situations (see e.g., Rosen, 1974; Pollack and
Wachter, 1975; Freeman 1979; and Brown, 1982).
In connection with recreational facilities, Brown (1982, p. 197) has
noted:
Hedonic analysis connects differences in characteristics (of a site) to
differences in expenditures individuals incur to obtain sites with dif-
ferent characteristics. If a beach resembles all other beaches except that
it is cleaner and costs $.v more per person to enjoy, the $x must be the
value of the added cleanliness for each person who gets to the clean
beach. Why spend $.\ unless the extra cleanliness is worth it?
The hedonic pricing method is theoretically appealing, but its
implementation imposes severe requirements. Data are needed to
estimate the parameter of two sets of regression equations. In the
first set, the amount of money spent on vacations is the dependent
variable. The explanatory variables in this equation are vacation
characteristics such as beach time, leisure time in the home, and
touring time during the vacation. These are used to determine the
implicit price of the beach time. This implicit price is used in the
second regression equation to estimate the beach demand. This
equation can then be used to estimate the welfare loss due to changes
of beach quality as a result of the oil spill.
So far as we know, the hedonic pricing method has not yet been
used to estimate nonmarket damages as a result of oil spills. The
main difficulty, as stated, is the need for large quantities of data.
Compensation for Damages:
A Review of the Legal Principles
This section discusses the fundamental legal doctrines that permit
individuals and public agencies to seek compensation for damages
from accidental oil spills, and the principles used by the courts to
decide these suits. Unless explicitly stated to the contrary, all ref-
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similar to the law of other countries. We also discuss in some detail
a specific law, the Outer Continental Sheff Lands Act (OCSLA)
Amendment of 1978, which relates to the management of resources
of the outer continental shelf.
The damages caused by an oil spill can affect (1) commercial
and/or noncommercial animal life, and (2) replaceable as well as
irreplaceable resources. Generally, compensation claims for dam-
ages are usually for:
1. Cleanup costs. These claims may be filed by individuals or
governments.
2. Loss of income as a result of damage to natural resources
by oil pollution. These claims are usually filed by individuals
such as fishermen.
3. Loss of income as an indirect consequence of oil pollution.
These claims are usually filed by businesses that depend on
tourism.
4. Damage to natural resources. These elaims are usually filed
by local, state, or national governments.
5. Loss of use of recreational facilities. These claims are usually
filed by individuals who cannot pursue their hobbies as a
result of oil spill.
Claims of Individuals for Compensation
Individuals usually seek redress for damages under the common
law. The common law, or private law, is judge-made law decided
in the courts on the basis of precedents, as opposed to statutary
law, which is written by the legislature.
To receive compensation for damages under the common law,
the plaintiff must show that there is an appropriate legal theory
of liabihty and how this theory is applicable to his claim. There
are several theories of liability under which a plaintiff may make
a claim. These are:
1. The Law of Nuisance. Most claims relating to oil spills are
based on this theory of liabihty, which will be discussed at
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2. The Law of Negligence. Many claims relating to oil spills
are based on this theory and, thus, this theory will also be
discussed in detail.
3. The Law of Strict Liability.
4. The Writ of Trespass quare clausum fregit.
5. The Law of Admiralty.
6. The Law of Unseaworthiness.
The last three theories listed above will not be discussed in this
paper because they are seldom used as bases for successful claims
relating to oil spills. Full discussions of all of these theories can
be found in Prosser (1966), McCormick (1935), and Gilmore and
Black (1975).
The Law of Nuisance. The law of nuisance focuses on the damages
or nuisance suffered by the plaintiff as a result of some action by the
defendant. This theory differentiates between Private Nuisance and
Public Nuisance. A claim can be filed under the Private Nuisance
doctrine when there is interference with private use or enjoyment
of land. In contrast. Public Nuisance requires interference with in-
terests common to the public at large, and not necessarily with the
interests of specific individuals.
Irrespective of whether the claim is filed under Private Nuisance
or Public Nuisance, this doctrine requires that the nuisance be
permanent or continuing for compensation to be granted. This
permanency requirement has been applied in different ways by dif-
ferent courts in connection with oil spills. In the case of Maryland
V. Amerada Hess Co. [350 F. Supp. 1060 (D. Md. 1972)], the court
had to rule on a claim for compensation for an oil spill that oc-
curred when a pipeline broke as it was transferring oil from a
tanker to a terminal. After consulting Maryland case law on Public
Nuisance, the court held that in each case examined there was an
element of an ongoing phenomenon consisting of some recurring
act or acts and/or a continuing condition [Id. at 1608).
On this basis, the court decided that a single instance of an oil
spill did not constitute an "ongoing phenomenon," and the petition
was denied. A similar interpretation was made by the court in Cyr
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However, other courts have not put the same emphasis on the
continuing nature ofthe nuisance. In Burgess v. M/V Tomano [370.
F. Supp. 247 (D. Me. 1973)], the court had to rule on claims for
compensation for damages from oil leakage from a tanker in Casco
Bay. The plaintiffs petitions were granted without any reference to
"ongoing phenomenon."
For a Private Nuisance claim, there must be a direct interference
with a private property. For this reason, owners of land or property
near the shore which has been in contact with oil have used this
doctrine successfully. For exactly the same reason, claims from
owners of property situated near a shoreline but not directly bor-
dering on it, have failed. Since the oil does not come into direct
contact with these properties, a direct interference with private
rights cannot be established.
Although the Public Nuisance doctrine is applicable to the inter-
ests of the public at large, an individual can bring a private action
under this doctrine if "he has suffered damages particular to him—
that is, damage different in kind, rather than simply in degree, from
that sustained by the public generally" (see Prosser, 1966).
This doctrine is well illustrated by the decision of the court in
Burgess. The oil leak from the tanker had affected commercial fish-
ermen and clam diggers, and businesses dependent on the tourist
trade. The fishermen and clam diggers could not seek compensation
under the Private Nuisance doctrine, since they could not claim to
own the sea or its produce.
The defendants argued that the Public Nuisance doctrine was
also not applicable since everyone has a right to fish or dig for
clams, not just those who actually do it for a living. These rights
are "public rights" held in trust by the state, and are not private
rights. However, the court declared that "the commercial fishermen-
and clam diggers in the present cases already have a special interest,
quite apart from the coastal waters of the State of Maine" {Id. at
250).
Thus, in this case, the court applied the principle that "Pecuniary
loss to the plaintiff will be regarded as different in kind where the
plaintiff has an established business making a commercial use ofthe
public right with which the defendant interferes" (see Prosser,
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Under the Law of Nuisance, having a right to compensation in
principle is not the same as getting the compensation in fact. The
plaintiffs still must prove that any fall in profits is a direct result
of the oil spill.
The Law of Negligence. Unlike the Law of Nuisance, this theory
focuses on the behavior of the defendant. Historically, the Law of
Negligence has been used in connection with damages sought for
spills resulting from land-based oil drilling (see Keeton and Jones,
1956).
To successfully seek compensation under the Law of Negligence,
the plaintiff must establish that (1) the defendant owed the plaintiff
a duty of care, i.e., the defendant had the responsibility of taking
care that the plaintiff did not suffer any loss due to the defendant's
action; (2) the defendant breached this duty, i.e., the defendant was
negligent; (3) the defendant's actions were the "proximate cause"
of the plaintiff's damages, i.e., the defendant's actions were a suffi-
ciently important cause ofthe actual loss to the plaintiff; and (4) the
defendant could have foreseen the damages his actions caused, i.e.,
the defendant knew what harm his conduct would bring about. In
other words, the plaintiff, usually a private citizen, has the "burden
of proof"; he must establish "negligent conduct" on the part ofthe
defendant by showing what went wrong to cause damage. This also
applies to maritime vessels.
To reduce the heavy burden for the plaintiff, the courts have in-
creasingly relied on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor, which literally
means "let the matter speak for itself" (see Prosser, 1971). Under res
ipsa loquitor, the plaintiff has to show only that he was injured, and
that the defendant's actions did contribute to his (the plaintiff's)
injuries. It is then up to the defendant to prove that he was not at
fault.
In this way. the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor is tantamount to a
reverse burden of proof. In effect, the defendant, who is assumed
to be more knowledgeable about what went wrong on the vessel
or drilling operation (which may be highly technical) has to prove
that he was not negligent.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor has been used in several cases
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(CD. Cal. 1970)]. It proved especially applicable in Skansi v. Humble
Oil and Refining Co. [176 So. 2d 236 (La. Ct. App. 1965)]. In this case,
the defendant, an oil company, had appealed a decision against it
for the loss of oysters due to oil pollution allegedly caused by oil-
drilling activities. In making its decision, the court accepted the
testimony ofan expert witness that the leakage of oil was an indi-
cation that the drilling equipment was not functioning as it should
have. The malfunction was taken by the courts to be sufficient evi-
dence of negligent conduct; the matter spoke for itself, res ipsa
loquitor. But for the malfunction, the pollution "would not have
occurred except for some fault or negligence on defendant's part"
(Id. at 238).
After negligence has been established, the plaintiff still has to
show that the defendant's conduct was a sufficiently important con-
tributory factor to his damage. This can be quite difficult to estab-
lish in cases relating to oil spills. Finally, as indicated earlier, the
plaintiff must also prove that the defendant could have foreseen
that his actions would lead to the type of damages that occurred.
The Law of Strict Liability. The fundamental notion behind this
theory is that those who undertake abnormally dangerous activities
should be held strictly liable. The doctrine of Strict Liability was
first enunciated in the English case Rylands v. Fletcher [L.R. 3 H.L.
330(1968)].
This doctrine had been historically applied to land-based oil
drilling, but the OCSLA of 1978 (described later) has extended it
to offshore activities. A good example of the application of strict
liability is found in Green v. General Petroleum Corp. [205 Cal. 328,
270 P. 952 (1928)]. In this case, the plaintiff sought compensation
for the damage caused by oil, gas, rocks, and other debris that had
been deposited on his property as a result of a blowout. The court
ruled in favor of the plaintiff, on the basis of the argument that:
Where one, in the conduct and maintenance of an enterprise lawful
and proper in itself, deliberately does an act under known conditions
and, with knowledge that injury may result to another, proceeds, and
injury is done to the other as the direct and proximate consequence of
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the injury should, in all fairness, be required to compensate the other
for the damage done. {Id. at 333-34)
Note that the doctrine of Strict Liability does not apply absolute
liability on the part of the defendant; i.e., in some instances the
defendant may not be held liable. For example, the defendant is not
liable if the injury is due to storms, earthquakes, or other natural
disasters, all of which are known as Acts of God.
The defendant is also not liable for the independent acts of a
third person that he could not have foreseen or prevented (see
Prosser, 1971 p. 321). This is clearly illustrated in the case of
Bianchini v. Humble Pipe Line Co. [480 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1973)]:
the defendant was not held liable when an unknown vessel struck
a pipeline, resulting in oil leakage. Although no cases have been
decided under this law, it is also held under OCSLA 43 U.S.C
18I4(c) that the defendant is not liable for acts of a third party if
(and only if) the damage is due solely to the third party.
Claims of States for Compensation'^
In an increasing number of oil spill cases, states have filed claims
for compensation for damage to wildlife and vegetation. This has
led to a controversy as to whether a state has any right to seek
redress for damages to things which technically it does not own.
In legal terminology, the right to sue is called a "right to action."
In order to have a right to action, the plaintiff must show that he
has (1) "standing" and (2) cause of action. "Standing" is the legal
term for whether or not the plaintiff is the person who properly
should seek compensation for the damage that has been done; if
the plaintiff is the proper person, then the plaintiff is said to have
"standing." For a person to get standing, it is enough to show that
he "has sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy to
obtain judicial resolution of the controversy" [see Sierra Club v.
Morton, 495 U.S. 727, 731 (1972)].
"Cause of action" refers to the facts that give a person the right
to sue. Technically, it refers to a "situation or state of facts which
would entitle a party to sustain an action and give him the right
to seek judicial interference in his behalf" [see Thompson v. Zurich
Insurance Co., 309 F. Supp. 1178, 1181 (D. Minn. 1970)].224 G. B. Assaf, B. G. Kroetch, and S. C. Mathur
In cases related to oil spills, states have used three doctrines to
gain standing: (1) proprietary interest, (2) trustee ofthe public trust,
and (3) parens patriae.
Proprietary Interest. Proprietary interest is "the interest ofan owner
of property together with all rights appurtenant thereto" [Black's
Law Dictionary 2098 (5th Ed. 1979)]. Simply put, if a state has a
proprietary interest, it has the same interests as an owner. Since it
is a basic tenet of the common law that owners of property can
sue for damages, if a state can show it has a proprietary interest,
that would give it a right to sue.
Early case law, for example Greer v. Connecticut [161 U.S. 519
(1896)], equated proprietary interest with ownership. However,
this notion has been rejected in more recent cases. The decisions
in Hughes v. Oklahoma [441 U.S. 322 (1979)] and In re Steuart
Transportation Company [No. 76-697-N (E.D. Va. July 1977 and
Feb. 1980)]*^ clearly state that neither the federal nor the state
government "own" living natural resources. In spite of this, the
courts held that they do have an important interest in them.
Trustee of the Public Trust. A "trust" is "a right of property, real
or personal, held by one party for the benefit ofthe other" [Black's
Law Dictionary 1352 (5th Ed. 1979)]. A trustee has an obligation
to ensure that the trust "corpus" is protected, i.e., remains intact,
and to seek compensation for damages. A "public trust" is a trust
in which the beneficiary is the public at large (see Sax, 1970).
In cases related to oil spills, the argument often used by the plain-
tiffs has been that the state is a trustee on behalf of the general pub-
lic and, in this role, has an obligation to protect wildlife and marine
life. Consequently, the state has a right to seek compensation for
damage to wildlife and marine life by oil pollution.
Parens Patriae. Literally translated, parens patriae means "parent
of the country." This doctrine was established in England as the
king's right to protect those of his citizens who were incapable of
looking after themselves. In the United States, parens patriae refers
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sovereign" interests which are distinct and apart from injuries
suffered by its individual citizens.
Generally, for a state to show that the parens patriae doctrine
applies, one of the following two conditions must be
1. The state suffers injury which is easily seen, such as to its economy,
or
2. The public at large suffers injury, but no specific individual has the
right to recover.
Nation-States' Claims for Compensation
International law. regarding the rights and responsibilities of nation-
states when an oil spill occurs on the high seas, has changed con-
siderably since the Torrey Canyon incident in 1967. Some changes
were introduced by the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative
Organization (IMCO) Legal Committee resolutions of 1969. The
major changes, however, were brought about by the Tanker Owner's
Voluntary Agreement on Liability for Oil Pollution (TOVALOP).
A complete description of recent international activities in this area
is found in M'Gonigle and Zacker (1979).
Before the Torrey Canyon incident, no major oil spill affecting
a coastline had occurred on the high seas, and the law was not
comprehensive. Otic major weakness of the law was that it did not
make clear who the party was against whom legal action should
be sought; the reason was that tanker operations involve citizens of
many countries, along with a complicated set of legal and financial
relationships between corporations registered in different countries.
A second weakness was that the extent of the liability of the re-
sponsible person was not clearly defined. The 1957 Convention on
the Limitation of Liability has set these limits at 1.000 gold francs
(approximately S67) per ton of the ship's "limitation tonnage."
However, no limit would apply if the ship's owner as well as the
crew or captain was found negligent. In contrast to this, under U.S.
law. the limit of the liability was set at the value of the ship and
cargo after the accident.
A third weakness was that the rights of coastal nation-states to
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were not clearly defined. Technically, no nation-state had a right
to interfere in activities on the high seas. Moreover, the 1954
Convention on the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil stated
that control over ships on the high seas belonged to the "flag"
nation-state. Together, these provisions left the rights of coastal
nation-states in a type of legal limbo, since most ships operated
under 'flags of convenience," and not of the major coastal states.
The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978
The 1978 Amendments to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
of 1953 (OCSLA) provide a much greater role for state and local
governments in deciding how the resources of the outer continental
shelf (OCS) should be managed.'^ Under Title III of the Act, liability
for offshore oil pollution damage is placed squarely on owners and
operators of vessels or offshore facilities. The Act also creates an Off-
shore Oil Pollution Compensation Fund to ensure that money is
available for the speedy removal of spilled oil incurred during oil
and gas exploration on the OCS. Administration of the fund is
shared by the Secretary of Transportation and the Secretary of the
Treasury. The fund is to be kept at between a minimum level of $110
million and a maximum of $200 million. It is financed primarily
by a fee not greater than $0.03 per barrel on all oil produced on
the OCS, although additional income is received from various fines,
penalties, and interest income.
Title 111 allows recovery for removal costs and damages. A claim
for removal costs can be made by any resident of the United States
or any government body. Claims may also be made for damage to,
or destruction of. real or personal property or natural resources.
In addition, those who previously obtained at least 25% of their
earned income from activities on the OCS but due to pollution
damage suffer reduced profits or earning capacity are eligible for
compensation. Both the President, in his capacity as "trustee" of the
OCS resources, and any state government can claim for damage to
or destruction of natural resources. Government bodies may also
claim for the period of one year for loss of tax revenues as a result
of damage to real or personal property. Also, the U.S. Attorney
General can bring a class action on behalf of individual citizens.Nonmarket Valuations of Accidental Oil Spills 227
The Act imposes strict liability for pollution damage, with a few
exceptions, on the owners and operators of private vessels or off-
shore installations. Title III limits this liability to $250,000 or $300
per gross ton, whichever is greater. However, liability is unlimited
if the damage is the result of wilful misconduct, gross negligence,
or where there has been a violation of federal safety standards.
Lability includes all removal costs incurred by the federal govern-
ment or any state or local government. The owner or operator of
an offshore installation is liable for total removal and cleanup costs
plus an amount not exceeding $35 million for all other damages.
The fund is responsible, without limit, for all damages and removal
costs that are not compensated from other sources, except when
there is gross negligence or wilful misconduct by the claimant, in
which case he cannot recover.
Description and Analysis of Two Oil Spills
This section discusses two major oil spills which clearly bring out
the problems involved in the application of economic and legal
principles to actual cases. Both cases have been extensively analyzed,
and both relate to the United States. Other incidents have also
raised many serious questions, such as the Torey Canyon and the
Amoco Cadiz spills, but these spills cannot be fully understood
without discussing English and French law, respectively, and so
they have been excluded from this paper.
For each incident the facts relating to the actual accident are pre-
sented first. Following this, the arguments and studies presented
by the plaintiffs and the defendants in the resultant legal suits are
explained and analyzed, using the economic and legal principles
outlined in the earlier sections. In addition, consideration is given
to studies of these incidents that have been conducted by inde-
pendent experts.
The Santa Barbara Channel Spill
The Santa Barbara Channel spill involved an oil well blowout and
a pipeline leak causing damages to harbors, aquatic life, shoreline
property, and beaches. This occurred after a year of occasional
seepages from the well. The spill occasioned the introduction of228 G. B. Assaf, B. G. Kroetch, and S. C. Mathur
novel legal theories of compensation for environmental damage of
biological resources.
Description ofthe Santa Barbara Channel Spill. In January 1969,
platform A in tract 4042, situated between the coast and a chain
of islands, began intermittent leakages of oil. Union Oil operated
platform A on behalf of a consortium including Texaco, Gulf Oil,
and Mobil Oil. An estimated 3.3 million gallons of crude oil were
released which eventually covered approximately 30 miles of beach.
Despite efforts, the oil could not be prevented from getting in-
to the harbors, with consequent damage to boats and shorehnc
buildings. Commercial fishing stopped completely in January and
did not begin again until April 1969. As a result of the spill, the
U.S. Department of Justice ordered a four-year moratorium on
drilling and production from platform A.
Analysis of the Santa Barbara Channel Spill. The Santa Barbara
Channel spill has been extensively analyzed by economists, lawyers,
and political scientists. This paper considers especially, among
others, the works of Mead and Sorensen (1970). Mead and Wilcox
(1974), Sorensen (1976a,b), and Mattson (1979).
As a result of the spill, there was damage to property as well as
to the incomes of fishermen, along with the loss of recreational
facilities. Mead and Sorensen have tried to estimate these costs.
According to Mead and Sorensen, Union Oil spent about $10.5
million to clean up the beaches and to prevent the further spread
of the oil. The value of the oil lost in the process was about $0.13
million. The various official agencies involved spent about $0.64
million in the cleanup process. The authors estimated the damage
to property at about $1.2 million. Together, these estimates of direct
cost add up to approximately $12.5 million (all values in constant
1969 dollars).
Attempts by Mead and Sorensen to estimate the indirect costs
posed many practical diiVicuUies. They found that tourism declined
in the city of Santa Barbara, presumably causing some loss of in-
come to the businesses dependent on the tourist trade, and some
loss of consumer surplus to the visitors. However, the tourist trade
increased at other vacation spots, presumably as a result of changesNonmarket Valuations of Accidental Oil Spills 229
in plans by tourists. This shift of the tourist trade meant that the
losses for one set of businesses implied gains for another set of
businesses; any computation of the loss to California society as a
whole should include the gain to businesses at the competing vaca-
tion spots.
These changes in the plans of the tourists also imply some loss
to the tourists, since they incurred extra travel costs and/or were
forced to go to a second-preference tourist spot. Mead and Sorensen
did not consider this, perhaps because they felt that this loss would
be relatively small.
The businesses affpcted by the decline in tourist trade sought
compensation from Union Oil. Claims were filed under the doc-
trines of Negligence and Nuisance. In a major case arising from the
spill. Union Oil v. Oppen [501 F.2d 570 (9th Cir. 1974)], the plain-
tiff's petition was denied. The court held that only those injured
parties whose livelihood depended on the direct use of the sea would
have legitimate claims.
Commercial fishermen were also affected by the oil spill. The
fishermen sued Union Oil for compensation under the doctrines of
Negligence and Nuisance. As explained in the preceding section,
under the doctrines of Negligence, the fishermen would have to
prove that the defendant was negligent, that the defendant's actions
were the cause of the plaintiff's losses, and that the defendant could
have foreseen this.
The defendant's negligence was not difficult to establish when
the oil was spilling at such a high rate. However, when the rate of
oil spilled decreased, il became more difficult to show that this
small spill led to reduced fisheries catches. The difiiiculty was in
proving it was the oil, and not a multitude of other plausible factors,
which led to the reduction of oyster and fish landings [see Douat
V. Texas Co., 205 La. 313, 17 So. 2d 340 (1944)].
The court accepted the plaintiff's argument that the defendant
could have foreseen the effects of his actions:
To assert that the defendants were unable to foresee that negligent
conduct resulting in a substantial oil spill could diminish aquatic life
and thus injure the plaintiffs is to suppose a degree of general ignorance
of the effects of oil pollution not in accord with good sense. {Id. at 569)230 G. B. Assaf, B. G. Kroetch, and S. C. Mathur
Note that while the compensation of the commercial fishermen
was decided on the grounds of negligence, the court argued that
the defendant's actions could also be construed as a public nuisance
under California law because the monetary loss was of a "particular
and special nature" {Id. at 570). The fishermen received $880,000
as compensation in 1977.
Sorensen (1976a,b) also eonsidered another type of indirect cost:
damage to the environment. Sorensen proposed replacement cost
as the appropriate method for estimating the short-term environ-
mental damage. As explained earlier, this method uses the prices
charged by biological supply houses to evaluate the loss of aquatic
hfe or wildlife. The weakness of this method has already been dis-
cussed. In the actual event, the State of California's suit was settled
out of court without any attribution of payments to particular
claims.
Mead and Sorensen (1970) attempted to estimate the value of
the recreational facilities lost by the residents, using the direct survey
approach ofthe willingness-to-pay method. They telephoned a ran-
dom group of 500 residents to find out the wilHngness to pay of the
average resident.
The residents were asked to compare their relative enjoyment of
a trip to the beach with a trip to a movie theater to see an "average"
movie. This method resulted in a recreational value loss of $3.15
million.
As we have pointed out, the direct survey approach is one way
of measuring the people's willingness to pay for recreational fa-
cilities. The ad hoc nature of this approaeh is obvious from the
study above. For present purposes, it is sufficient to say that there
would be no theoretical justification for using the figure of $3.15
million as an estimate for either the compensated variation, the
loss of consumer surplus, or the total wiUingness to pay for re-
creational facilities.
One group of residents tried to claim compensation for the loss
of recreational facilities. In Oppen v. Aetna Insurance Co. [485 F.2d
(9th Cir. 1974)], private owners of pleasure boats made a claim for
the loss of navigation rights in the habor and channel at Santa
Barbara. The plaintiffs used the doetrine of Public Nuisance to sup-
port their claim. However, the court ruled that loss of navigation
rights was suffered by the public in general, and that the plaintiffsNonmarket Valuations of Accidental Oil Spills 231
were not affected differently from the general public {Id. at 260).
Consequently, the plaintiff's claim was denied. Note, however, that
the court granted that actual physical damages to the boats were
recoverable by the owners.
The Zoe Colocotroni Spiil
The Zoe Colocotroni spill brought forth further novel legal issues,
with an explicit consideration by the courts of the economic methods
to be used for calculating indirect costs.
Description of the Zoe Colocotroni Spill. The Zoe Colocotroni, on
route from Venezuela to Puerto Rico, grounded on a reef on March
18, 1973, just 3 miles off the southern coast of Puerto Rico. The
tankship was carrying 187,670 barrels of crude oil at the time of
grounding. In an attempt to free the ship from the reef, the captain
ordered some of the cargo dumped into the sea. The release totaled
about 50,000 barrels of crude oil and resulted in an oil slick about
4 miles long and 0.1 miles wide.
The oil slick washed onto the beaches and into a 4-mile-long
mangrove forest which fronts the Bahia de Sucia in southwestern
Puerto Rico. The oil penetrated to a depth of 14 in. into the sedi-
ments of the forests, damaging the roots of the mangroves, thereby
affecting an important "intertidal habitat for crustaceans such as
barnacles and crabs, as well as snails, bees and reptiles" [National
Wetlands Newsletter, March-April 1981, p. 12).
Analysis of the Zoe Colocotroni Spill. The U.S. government, the
government of Puerto Rico, and a large group of fishermen filed
claims for damages. The claim of the Puerto Rico government raised
some critical legal questions. This discussion will be confined to
that claim, since the other claims essentially repeated the major
issues involved.
The Puerto Rican government's claim totaled $14.7 million and
covered the following costs: (1) the direct costs of cleanup and
control ($0.78 million); (2) the direct costs of removing dead and
dying mangrove trees, and removing and replacing all soiled sedi-
ments {$7.17 million); (3) the direct costs of replanting 23 acres from
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million); (4) the direct costs of environmental damages, calculated
by the replacement cost method, for marine animals killed ($5.5
million); and (5) the direct costs of environmental damages, cal-
culated from the costs of a long-run scientific research project to
study and mitigate future damages ($1.39 million).' ^ Note that the
Puerto Rican government had to claim current as well as future
costs at the same time because of the legal principle of "one bite
at the cherry"—only one suit can be brought for damages.
The first task of the Puerto Rican government was to show that
it had standing. There was no doubt that the Puerto Rican govern-
ment owned the swampland harmed by the oil; for that reason, like
any other landowner, the government could bring an action under
the Law of Admiralty.'" However, the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico also sought damages on behalf of its people "for loss of living
natural resources such as trees and animals" in Puerto Rico v. S.S.
Zoe Colocotroni [628 F2d 652. 670-71 (1st Cir. 1980)].
The plaintiff claimed that the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
was a "public trustee" of the damaged resources, while the defendant
argued that Puerto Rico did not have this status. The district court
ruled that under an existing statute [P.R. Laws Ann. Lit. 12 Sec.
1131 (29) (1977)], the Commonwealth did have a proper "cause of
action" in Statute Law (i.e., law written by the legislature), and thus
the plaintiff did not need to resolve the issue of whether or not the
Commonwealth had a right under the common law to recover for
things it did not own; the court simply avoided the issue.
The district court ruled that Puerto Rico could bring suit be-
cause it (1) had a "proprietary interest" in the harmed natural
resources, (2) was the "trustee of the public trust" of these re-
sources, and (3) was parens patriae. These concepts were discussed
earlier.
This dispute about Puerto Rico's right to sue related only to its
claim for environmental damage. There was no such dispute about
Puerto Rico's claim for direct costs. However, the district court did
not grant the claim of $7.2 million for removing injured mangrove
trees and oiled sediments, on the grounds that this plan would
result in considerable damage to the environment, without any
guarantee of ultimate success. The other two claims for direct costs
were granted.Nonmarket Valuations of Accidental Oil Spills 233
Once Puerto Rico's standing had been established, there still
remained the question of the amount of compensation for the envi-
ronmental damage. The fact that the wildlife did not have any com-
mercial value was a major source of controversy in the case. The
arguments involved are too complex to be discussed in full here,
but essentially, the conclusion was that although the aquatic life
and/or vegetation may not have had commercial value, it did
have ecological value because the organisms that had been des-
troyed were vital links in the aquatic food chain.
On the basis of the foregoing logic, the court concluded that the
destruction of trees and animals did have a detrimental impact on
Puerto Rico's natural environment, with consequent injury to the
people of Puerto Rico.
In determining the compensation, the district court accepted the
replacecost method, and granted Puerto Rico the $5.5 milhon it
had claimed. This decision of the district court was appealed by
the defendants to the U.S. First Circuit Court of Appeals. The
defendants claimed that the "plaintiffs were entitled only to the
difference in the value of the property before and after the spill—that
is, the value of the property had diminished because of the damage
inflicted to it by the oil" (Jimenez, 1982, p. 223).
The appeals court did not accept the defendant's argument. In-
stead, the court argued that the concept of restoring or rehabili-
tating the environment was implicit in much of the relevant federal
legislation enacted in the t970s. Nevertheless, the appeals court re-
jected the replacement cost method used by the district court to
estimate the damage to the environment. The principal reason for
this rejection was that, as a practical matter. Puerto Rico had no
intention of replacing the organisms {see Brown, 1982, p. 201). The
appeals court did not try to estimate the damages itself. Instead, it
remanded the case, asking the trial court to use a more suitable
method to estimate these damages {Jimenez, 1982, p. 236).
Summary
This paper has presented an overview of legal and economic theo-
ries currently used to assess liability and damages for accidental
oil spills. After a discussion of the theoretical concepts, two case234 G. B. Assaf, B. G. Kroetch, and S. C. Mathur
studies were presented. The methods that had been used to assess
liabihty and damages in these cases were critically assessed.
The relevant theories used to estimate the nonmarket-valued
economic loss due to oil pollution were presented. Although several
difFerent theoretical methods have been used in economics to calcu-
late the benefits of nonmarket goods and therefore the monetary
value of the loss of these goods, the usefulness of each of these
methods is unfortunately limited by data requirements and some
degree of empirical bias.
The legal principles used to assess damage claims for compensa-
tion in oil spill cases where damage has occurred to commercial
and/or noncommercial animal life, and to replaceable as well as
irreplaceable resources, were discussed. It was shown that the law
used in accidental oil spill cases is complex, and in some cases,
ambiguous in theory and in practice. This was evidenced in the
cases related to the Santa Barbara spill and the Zoe Colocotroni
spill.
As should be clear from our discussion, the existing state of the
arts concerning accidental oil spills in economics and law is far
from satisfactory: a multitude of often competing and confusing
approaches exist in both law and economics. What is required is
a unifying thread which draws the disparate bodies of analysis into
a coherent whole. This, we believe, should be the emphasis of future
research.
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Notes
1. Estimating losses can-sometimes be difficult even when market prices
are known. For instance, estimating the loss of income to commercial
fisheries arising from accidental oil spills is extremely difficult (despite theNonmarket Valuations of Accidental Oil Spills 235
known market value of the catch) because the quantity of catch lost is
not known with certainty.
2. See Bishop and Heberlein (1979).
3. See Brown (1982).
4. The degree of bias depends on (1) the relative magnitudes of the
substitution and income effects of a price change, (2) the importance of
the commodity in the consumer's budget, and (3) the income elasticity of
demand. For a more detailed discussion of this, see Griffin and Steele
(1980, pp. 46-49). For a discussion of how to measure the bias, see Willig
(1976, pp. 589-597) and Henderson and Quandt (1980, pp. 25-31).
5. Although the possible strategic bias is the major problem associated
with the direct survey approach, there are several other biases that may
arise. See, for instance, Randall (198t).
6. For an excellent empirical analysis using the travel cost approach,
see Smith et al. (1983). The model they use is an extension ofthe varying
parameter model presented by Vaughan and Russell (1982), but allows
for site-specific benefits of improved water quality, instead of national
(or average) willingness to pay across all sites. As suggested by Smith et
al., a site-specific evaluation is preferred.
7. For this review, we have drawn heavily on Walmsley (1975) and
Gordon (1980-1981).
8. See Environ. Law Rep. 7: 20658-20661; 9: 20237-20242; 10: 20278.
9. See "State protection of its economy and environment, parens patriae
suits for damages," Columbia J. Law Social Prob. 6: 411 (1970).
10. See 43 U.S.C. 1331 et seq., and also, Krueger and Singer (1979)
have codified earlier tendencies and established new developments.
11. See Jimenez (1982. pp. 230-232).
12. See Restatement (Second) of Torts, Sec. 871 (international harm to
property).
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